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applicable to subsequent taxpayer suits by different taxpayers inclusive
of all issues which could have been raised in prior suits, or merely
those questions actually litigated previously?
The Court of Appeals resolved this matter in Murphy v. Erie
County, 4 one of several taxpayers' actions unsuccessfully challenging
various transactions concerning construction and management of a
stadium by Erie County. A prior taxpayer suit, which merely raised a
threshold question regarding the absence of competitive bidding, had
been dismissed on the merits.149 Defendants in Murphy argued that
the prior action was a complete defense to this action under the doc-
trine of res judicata. The Court weighed the desirability of an end to
taxpayer suits concerning a particular matter against their usefulness
as a check on abuse of official power and held that said doctrine bars
only litigation of those issues which were litigated in prior taxpayer
suits.15 0
The doctrine of res judicata should not prevent courts from passing
upon the merits of contentions not presented in a previous taxpayer
suit. Otherwise, an initial ineffectual challenge will bar forever from
judicial consideration valid challenges to unlawful actions. For, "[t]he
effect of the judgment is not at all dependent upon the correctness of
the verdict or finding upon which it was rendered."' 51 In light of the
potential danger inherent in barring subsequent taxpayer actions, the
doctrine of res judicata should be applied only when the arguments
of the subsequent plaintiffs have been presented adequately and con-
sidered on the merits. 152
ARTCLE 40 - TRIAL. GENERALLY
CPLR 4011: Interposition of interlocutory judgment is discretionary
with the court.
Separate trials on the issues of liability and of damages are proper
under CPLR 603.15 Under CPLR 4011, a court is empowered to
"regulate the conduct of the trial in order to achieve a speedy and
City of Oswego, 207 App. Div. 134, 141, 202 N.Y.S. 243, 247 (4th Dep't 1923), aft'd, 238
N.Y. 606, 144 N.E. 911 (1924).
14828 N.Y.2d 80, 268 N.E.2d 771, 320 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1971), aff'g 34 App. Div. 2d 295,
310 N.Y.S.2d 459 (4th Dep't 1970), aff'g 60 Misc. 2d 954, 304 N.Y.S.2d 242 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1969).
149 Hurd v. Erie County, 34 App. Div. 2d 289, 310 N.Y.S.2d 953 (4th Dep't 1970).
150 28 N.Y.2d at 85-86, 268 N.E.2d at 773, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 32.
151 Wilson's Executor v. Deen, 121 U.S. 525, 534 (1887).
152See 5 WK&M 5011,35; Developments in the Law -Res Judicata, 65 Htv. L.
Rav. 818, 858-59 (1952).
153 See Berman v. J.J. Enterprises, Inc., 13 App. Div. 2d 199, 214 N.Y.S.2d 945
(1st Dep't 1961).
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unprejudiced disposition of the matters at issue in a setting of proper
decorum." The latter section enables the court to utilize the split trial
procedure.
Some confusion has arisen regarding the circumstances under which
a defendant can appeal a determination for the plaintiff on the liability
issue before trial of the issue of damages. In Bliss v. Londner,5 4 the
Second Department had held that appeal of such determination must
await entry of judgment, a mere ruling on the matter in the course of
trial not being immediately appealable. 55 Subsequently, the First De-
partment, in Hacker v. City of New York, 156 held that there is an appeal
as of right of the judgment in a separate trial on the liability issue
prior to the trial of the damages issue. 57 To achieve uniformity with
the First Department, the Second Department, in Fortgang v. Chase
Manhattan Bank,158 then decided to entertain immediate appeals from
an interlocutory judgment on the liability issue alone. 59
These developments in the law have inspired this question: Does
the immediate right of appeal available with separate trials also apply
when the split trial procedure is invoked in a continuous proceeding?
In Jack Parker Construction Corp. v. Williams,160 petitioner,
pursuant to article 78 of the CPLR, sought to compel entry of an
interlocutory judgment in a negligence action in which he was a defen-
dant. The jury had returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff solely
on the liability issue during a split trial. The trial judge declined to
interpose an interlocutory judgment, which is necessary to immediate
appeal. 161
The Appellate Division, Second Department, approved use of the
split trial procedure for speedier and more efficient disposition of
cases, 162 and preferred "immediate trial of the damage question before
the same jury which decided liability."' 63 It recognized, however, the
trial judge's discretion to interpose an interlocutory judgment in ex-
ceptional cases, to permit appeal prior to completion of the entire
154 20 App. Div. 2d 640, 246 N.Y.S.2d 296 (2d Dep't 1964).
155 Id. at 640, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 297.
15625 App. Div. 2d 35, 266 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Ist Dep't 1966).
157Id. at 37, 266 N.YS.2d at 196.
158 29 App. Div. 2d 41, 285 N.Y.S2d 110 (2d Dep't 1967).
2591d. at 42-43, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 111-12.
160 35 App. Div. 2d 839, 317 N.Y.S.2d 911 (2d Dep't 1970).
181 Id. at 839-40, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
162See Zeisel & Callahan, Split Trial and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76
HARv. L. REv. 1606 (1963).
163 35 App. Div. 2d at 839, 317 N.YS.2d at 912; see 7B MCKINNav'S CPLR 603, supp.
commentary at 42 (1966).
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trial. 64 The Fortgang case, in which the court had spoken in general
terms, was limited to the facts of the Hacker case, which it was in-
tended to follow.'65 Hacker expressly did not apply to the continuous
proceeding, wherein one jury either tries both issues simultaneously
or promptly hears the damages question after returning a verdict on
the liability issue.166
The Second Department properly resolved the question of the
right to immediate appeal on the liability issue alone in a split trial
by permitting the trial judge to weigh the equities and interpose an
interlocutory judgment when justice requires. Courts ordinarily will
realize the advantage and economy in allowing the same jury, with its
familiarity with the facts, to try the issue of damages. This will ex-
pedite trial of the damages question and probably result in more equit-
able damage verdicts.167 Where this procedure unduly prejudices the
defendant or in other special circumstances, however, the court may
interpose an interlocutory judgment and thus allow earlier appeal.
CPLR 4011: Prejudicial separation of issues of liability and of damages
requires retrial.
CPLR 4011 restates the power to determine the sequence of issues
presented at trial which common law vested in the trial judge. 68 In
the absence of distinct statutory mandate to the contrary, it frees the
trial court to effect rapid and just disposition by those means which
the court's discretion dictates. As a result of this broad power, most
negligence actions are "bifurcated trials."' 69 wherein the issue of liabil-
ity is tried separately from and prior to the issue of damages. 70 Thus,
unnecessary litigation is avoided, since no trial of damages occurs if
the liability issue is determined in the defendant's favor. Where the
nature of the plaintiff's injuries has a significant bearing on the issue
of the defendant's liability, however, a "bifurcated trial" may prejudice
the plaintiff's case. Williams v. City of New York' 71 illustrates how a
trial court's decision to modify the usual trial sequence may substan-
tially influence both the trial and the judgment 72
164 Id.; see 4 WK&M 4011.05.
165 25 App. Div. 35, 37, 266 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196 (Ist Dep't 1966).
166 Id. at 36-37, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 195-96.
167 See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 603, supp. commentary at 42 (1966).
108 See 4 WK&M 4011..04.
169 See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 4011, supp. commentary at 33 (1966).
170 CPLR 603 states: "In furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice the court
may order a separate trial of any claim or any separate issue .. "
171 36 App. Div. 2d 620, 318 N.Y.S.2d 536 (2d Dep't 1971) (mem.).
172 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 4011, supp. commentary at 33 (1966).
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